The 31st Meeting on Global
Environment Problems
After COP3: Future Negotiations on
Climate Change Issue and IPCC

On December 15, 1997, the meeting took place on the above theme at the No. 3 Building of the Japan Bicycle Hall. A lecture was made there by Katsuo Seiki, executive director, Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute (GISPRI). A summary of his lecture follows:

It would be a bold attempt to assess COP3 only four days after the conference ended. But I would like to discuss the following four topics:

1. Negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
2. Developments after the negotiations
3. Kyoto Protocol
4. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)

1. Negotiations on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

1.1 History of Negotiations

The knowledge about UNFCCC negotiations six years ago may be important to knowing the significance of the Kyoto conference. So I here discuss what the negotiations were.

In August 1990, environment ministers met in Sweden to give a mandate for negotiations at the Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee, which were scheduled to start in 1991. The UNFCCC negotiations were launched then. Upon the ministerial meeting, the Japanese government made a cabinet decision on "the Global Warming Prevention Program" to stabilize per capita carbon dioxide emissions at a 1990 level by the year 2000. Emission controls under the convention were voluntary so that everyone now believes the Japanese cabinet decision has no binding power. But the cabinet decision has never been reversed but must have binding power in Japan. The decision has actually been faded away with time.

The negotiations started at the first INC meeting, or INC-1, in Shanty, suburban Washington, in January 1991 and ended at the final meeting, or INC-8, in New York in May 1992. The INC-8 negotiations lasted throughout the night before ending as the final session of the Kyoto Conference did. But they were not at the ministerial level. The convention negotiations were roughly concluded at the working level, and what ministers had to do was to sign the convention in Rio de Janeiro. At the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, however, nothing was decided on before minister gathered. In this respect, it may well be said that preliminary talks for the Kyoto Protocol were less sufficient than for the UNFCCC.

1.2 Features of Convention

The UNFCCC was signed in Rio de Janeiro in June 1992 and took effect in March 1994. The convention did not provide for any purpose of restricting greenhouse gas emissions. One specified purpose of the convention was "to stabilize the greenhouse gas emission concentration." The convention's most significant and famous provisions were specified in its Article 4. The article provided for Annex I on certain national obligations. This did not oblige any nation to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. The provisions only called on the signatories to take measures to stabilize greenhouse gas emissions. The signatories were thus required to take energy-saving or energy-shifting measures. But the stabilization was left as voluntary.

When the provisions on certain national obligations were written, there was an idea of "pledge and review." As negotiator, I talked to various persons on the idea for one year. There were three reasons for emphasizing the "review." The pledge means to make a pledge to cut emissions 15% without specifying how to do it, as the European Union did at the Kyoto conference. Setting goals is insufficient unless numerical goals are accompanied by specific ways to achieve the goals, or to review developments. Reviewing would lead pledge-making parties to assume the responsibility for achieving goals and would give opportunities for information exchanges and education.

1.3 Dynamics of UNFCCC Negotiations

The UNFCCC negotiations had a variety of dynamics. I would like to reconfirm the dynamics because the Kyoto Protocol negotiations had the same dynamics. In the UNFCCC negotiations, especially the United States and China emphasized the framework, that is, core of the framework convention. Because the framework convention was subject to the negotiations, participants as a matter of course agreed on the goal while being divided over how to achieve that. There were complicated conflicts of interests between the North and South, between North industrial countries and between South developing nations.

In the conflict between North industrial countries, the European Union and the United States until the conclusion continued to differ over whether the stabilization of greenhouse emissions by 2000 should be legally binding. In the North-South conflict, the South argued that industrial countries, or the North, were responsible for controlling greenhouse emissions and that the South will have to do nothing unless industrial nations provide funds and technologies. Special attention can be warranted to the conflict between South developing countries. China was willing to avoid specific obligations for industrial countries because it could be forced to assume such obligations in a decade. On the other hand, the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) differed with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), as you know well.

2. Developments after UNFCCC Negotiations

The structures of conflicts have basically remained intact. At the first conference of the parties to the UNFCCC, or COP1, in Berlin in March 1995, the participants agreed a@ to set tougher numerical goals beyond 2000 for the Annex I countries, aA to impose no new obligations on developing countries and aB to take the action for joint implementation for a pilot period to 2000. When I saw the Berlin Mandate in March 1995, I thought the agreement to impose no new obligations on developing countries was unbelievable. In fact, the convention itself provided for its review by 1998. I still think the parties did not have to hastily develop the Berlin Mandate to toughen obligations only for industrial nations.

In December 1995, the IPCC issued the Second Assessment Report (SAR). I here introduce what the report said. First, the SAR discussed the impact of human activities on climate change for the first time. It emphasized that human activities, especially consumption of fossil fuels and resultant emissions, have had an impact on climate change.

Second, the projected IPCC climate change scenario puts a temperature increase at 2 degrees centigrade and a rise in the sea surface at 50 centimeters for the year 2100 in terms of median estimate. I call attention to the fact that the estimates were so wide-ranging that they are quite uncertain. The climate is always accompanied by the inertia so that the effect of a rise in the density of greenhouse gases does not emerge immediately. Once the effect emerges, however, it will be irreversible. The SAR report said as the second point that the uncertainties and inertia should warrant the enhanced risk management.

Third, the SAR said the impact would include not only the higher sea surface but also changes in rainfall patterns, changes in areas suitable for farming, a loss of the biodiversity and disasters. The problem is that developing countries would be affected more than industrial nations. The fourth point involves how the scenario should be interpreted. The IPCC does not view the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions as the only option. This involves the time flexibility. In other words, there should be some flexibility in the years soon after 2000. Some argue that even if greenhouse gas emissions increase in the years, later reductions would solve problems.

The SAR as a whole adopts not only a no-regret policy but also the prevention principle, urging that every nation go ahead with prevention measures while shouldering reasonable costs. It says the most important point is that we should be ready to take advantage of emerging scientific information and promptly make policy changes as required, rather than trying to immediately make the best policy for the coming century.

3. Kyoto Protocol

3.1 Process of Kyoto Protocol Negotiations

The process of the protocol negotiations had some features. Basically, however, the negotiations maintained the unchanged structure of the North-South conflict. Furthermore, no country took the leadership as in the past. The United States has had taken the leadership for most of major international conferences. But it failed to do so at the Rio de Janeiro conference in 1992. So did the EU. Japan for its part has lacked the power to take the leadership. The biggest problem in the process of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations was the lack of leadership.

Another point for us to realize is that nongovernment organizations, or NGOs, were remarkably active at the Kyoto Conference. NGOs closely contacted each delegation off the negotiating table and gave various advices and warnings. Owing to such activities of NGOs, the conference achieved far more comprehensive consensus than the Japanese government had expected earlier. The most sensitive to the influence and actions of NGOs may have been the EU.

The protocol negotiations also featured the straying position of the United States that was not seen in the convention negotiations. Japan avoided being confused at the convention negotiations because the United States maintained a persistent position. The United States rejected any binding power for the convention and Japan was able to make its negotiating position in view of such U.S. position. At the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, however, the United States was shaken very much. Tim Wirth resigned as U.S. State Department negotiator for the Kyoto Conference by his preference just before the December gathering, leading other countries to believe the influence of environmentalists declined on the U.S. delegation. But Vice President Al Gore visited Kyoto in the final phase of the conference to urge the U.S. delegation on behalf of President Bill Clinton to be more flexible. Our failure to understand the U.S. position added fuel to confusion at the Kyoto Conference.

On the other hand, participants refrained from imposing new obligations on developing countries. I think their obligations should have been part of a package agreement. The package should have had four points. The first point, as a matter of course, was industrial countries' obligations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The second involved the joint implementation of reductions and the emission allowance market to give the flexibility to the obligations. The third was developing countries' voluntary participation in emission reductions, which had been incorporated into the chairman's proposal. Article 10 "developing countries' voluntary participation" was eventually dropped. Another point was technology transfer. I believe technology transfer will play a role in narrowing North-South differences. But no clause in the convention can activate technology transfer. Negotiators focused on QUELROs, or numerical goals, and could not afford to discuss other matters including technology transfer. Unless this practice changes, negotiations under the convention will not be so successful.

The problem with the negotiations is distrust between developing and industrial countries. Japan and the United States would limit their commitments if China were to take no action. China for its part would do nothing if Japan and the United States make no commitment. If we were to negotiate any obligations on China or India, we would have to cut the vicious circle of mutual distrust and discuss a package including such obligations.

I have reiterated the word of package. The pursuit of a package agreement had been the position of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry in the first place. Yasuhiro Inagawa, director-general of the Agency of Natural Resources and Energy, reiterated that the negotiations should have three purposes. The first is industrial countries' obligations. The second is developing countries' participation and the third is a technology initiative including technology development and transfer. I agreed to his view and discussed the three purposes on various occasions. As far as the Kyoto Conference is concerned, however, only industrial countries' obligations were discussed and the only comprehensive conclusion was on this matter. In this respect, I suppose that the Kyoto Conference lacked important components.

3.2 Features of Kyoto Protocol

The protocol requires the EU to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 8%, the United States by 7%, Japan by 6% and Russia by zero. In the chairman's initial proposal, the percentage was 10% for the EU, 4.5% for Japan and 5% for the United States and Russia. The change for Russia may indicate that the Russians have gained substantial allowances. Subject to reductions are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane and nitrogen dioxide (NO2), as well as three chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) substitute gases. The standard year for the CFC substitute reductions was set as 1995. As for sinks, afforestation and lumbering in and after 1990 will be taken into account.

The protocol also created the clean development mechanism (CDM). This is not a fund but an organization under which industrial nations would get credits in a constructive manner and developing countries would facilitate their development projects. It would be a kind of clearinghouse.

A provision for developing countries' participation in emission reductions was dropped as I said earlier. Another issue is the condition for the protocol to take effect. Japan's proposal had called for the protocol to go into force if the protocol is ratified by countries covering 75% of global greenhouse gas emissions. Under the proposal, the protocol would not take effect unless the U.S. Senate ratifies it. But the percentage was reduced to 55% so that the protocol will go into force even if the U.S. Senate rejects it. In this case, the United States will not be obliged to cut emissions while Japan and the EU will be obliged to do so.

3.3 Problems for Japan

Whether Japan could achieve the required emission reduction should not be a problem. Once the requirement is fixed, Japan should fulfill that at any cost. Is the required reduction sufficient? The answer is no. Any requirement at this stage cannot be sufficient. As for equity among countries, the required reduction of 6% for Japan or 7% for the United States will be far more difficult to attain than 8% for the EU. The agreement on emission reductions should be termed unequal.

How would be macroeconomic effects of the protocol? The Ministry of International Trade and Industry warns that Japan would see more unemployment and less economic growth. This could be possible. But I generally think that the economy is flexible enough to overcome the possible difficulties with the emergence of new industries. Effects on competitiveness were discussed. Basically, however, I believe that competitiveness is a matter of comparative advantage and should not involve absolute environmental costs.

4. IPCC

The IPCC was established by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) in 1988 to pursue consensus among scientists. The IPCC reports must be adopted or approved by governments in principle. In this respect, it is an intergovernmental panel. The IPCC does not make policy recommendations but assesses policy ideas. It abides by the principle of the peer review process, where experts in certain fields undertake examination and assessment. Under the principle, the IPCC uses only the existing theses that have passed the peer review.

The biggest duty of the IPCC toward the year 2000 is to make the third assessment report (TAR). I here discuss some features of the TAR. The IPCC has so far focused on the artificial effects on climate change. The second assessment report (SAR) has already given a conclusion on the matter. The TAR will thus tackle the next problem, focusing on what we should do under the adaptation or prevention strategy. Therefore, the IPCC will have to improve the appropriateness of policy analyses.

The IPCC has so far discussed global problems, but it is going in the direction of dealing with regional problems as well. For example, it will consider the effect of climate change on Asia and the strategy for Asia to adopt. The IPCC will also tackle socioeconomic problems. The existing technologies can enable people to make substantial achievements, but people lack the willingness to do so. This is a big socioeconomic problem.

Finally, I would like to make a request to industrialists here. American researchers have so far dominated IPCC reports. The IPCC is calling for a wider range of participants in the TAR. It wants more researchers and industrialists from Japan, China and other Asian countries to take part in the next report. I ask you for cooperation.